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CONFINEMENT OF THE SEXUALLY IRRESPONSIBLE [UNITED STATES]
In Minnestota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County1 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld
the validity of the Minnesota statute entitled "An act relating to persons having
a psychopathic personality" which had
previously received the approval of the
Supreme Court of that State.3 The statute in brief provides for civil commitment to the state hospital for the insane
of those persons found to be irresponsible
in sexual conduct and thus dangerous to
others. After defining the term "psychopathic personality," the act provides that
all laws relating to the insane or allegedly
insane shall apply to all persons having
or alleged to have a psychopathic personality. Section 3 provides, however, that the
existence of such condition in any person shall not constitute a defense to a
criminal charge. Before proceedings
against an individual are instituted; facts
must first be submitted to the county attorney who, if convinced that good cause
for a hearing exists, prepares a petition to
be executed by a person having knowledge of the facts and then filed with the
judge of the probate court. In the hearing that follows, the court must appoint
two licensed doctors of medicine to assist
in the examination. There is no provision
for a jury. The person being examined

may be represented by counsel; and if
financially unable, the court may appoint
one for him. Such person is entitled to
have subpoenas issued out of the court
to compel attendance of witnesses in his
behalf. All the proceedings must be reduced to writing and become a part of
the records of the court. From an order
committing the person examined to confinement for treatment, an appeal lies to
the district court.
The Minnesota statute was no doubt
in large part prompted by the apparent
increase in sex crime in the 1930's 4 which
focused the attention of the public and
legislators on one of the most difficult and
complex problems within the whole range
of the administration of the criminal law. 5
In coping with the problem presented by
the sex offender, the legislator is confronted with the delicate task of balancing his natural interest in the protection
of society with the basic constitutional
guaranties of personal liberties.6 For
many years psychopathologists, psychiatrists, and neurologists have criticized the
tests of responsibility as leaving a noman's land between the sane and legally
insane; and it is in this twilight zone that
the so-called "psychopathic personality"
7
is to be found.

1309 U. S.270 (1940).
2 Mason's
Minn. Stat. 1927 (Supp. 1940)
§§8992-184a-8992-184d.
3State ex rel. Charles Edwin Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County and Another,
205 Minn. 545, 287 N. W. 297 (1939).
4 A report of offenses known to police in 68
cities of over 100,000 population indicates that
rape offenses, for example, increased from 276
in 1931 to 430 in 1939. 10 Uniform Crime Reports (No. 1) (1939) 6-7. That this increase is

more apparent than real has been frequently
suggested. Note, 3 John Marshall L. Q. 407
(1938). Also Strecher, Challenge of Sex Offenders; Introduction, 22 Mental Hygiene 1
(1938).
5 Challenge of Sex Offenders, 22 Mental Hygiene 1-24 (1938).
6 Hughes, The Minnesota "Sexual Irresponsibles Law," 25 Mental Hygiene 76 (1940).
7Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law, 96 (1933).
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In the past, the sex offender has been
treated largely as any other offenderthat is, by inflicting fine or imprisonment
after the offense has been committed.
Every state has a long list of sex offenders
for which punishments of varying severity
have been provided.8 That this method
alone has proven unsuccessful is generally conceded. First, the percentage of convictions for sex offenses has been low.9
Second, it is very doubtful whether criminal prosecution of most sex offenses has
proven to be a deterrent. The sex offender is notoriously a recidivist. 10 Third,
psychiatrists are in general accord that a
prison is not a satisfactory place for the
treatement of corrigible sex offenders."
Fourth, confinement of sex offenders with
other offenders creates anything but a
2
healthful situation in the prisons.
Another more remote approach to the
general problem is provided in sterilization legislation. 1 3 Since the decision of
the Sunreme Court of the United States
in Buck v. Bell' 4 upholding the constitutionality of the Virginia statute, the state
courts have generally given their sanction

to such laws.' 5 But it is clear that the
purposes and approach of sterilization
legislation are quite different from those
of the Minnesota law under consideration.
The fundamental idea of the sterilization
movement is to reduce the number of
mental defectives with which society must
otherwise contend in the future,16 one
significant group of which is made up of
certain types of sex offenders. The Minnesota statute is likewise designed as a
preventive measure. But its purpose is
to deal with the sexual psychopathics already a part of society by providing permanent confinement for those who do not
respond to psychiatric treatment, and confinement and treatment for the curables
until they may safely be permitted to resume their place in the community. The
Minnesota law is designed to deal with
the victims both
of bad heredity and bad
7
environment.1
The Minnesota law is not the first of its
kind. Somewhat similar legislation has
been enacted in Michigan' s and Illinois, 9
but a substantial part of the Michigan
statute has been declared unconstitutional

sIllinois Criminal Code, Chap. 38, Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1939, describes at least ten distinct types
of sexual offenses for which punishment is provided.
0 There are a number of reasons for this.
The strict rules of evidence which must necessarily operate in these cases make convictions
difficult. Often the victim of a sex offense is
reluctant to comblain to the authorities. See
MacCormick, Challenge of Sex Offenders: New
York's Present Problem, 22 Mental Hygiene 1,
5 (1938).
Iold. at 6.
11 Dietholm, Treatment in Psychiatry, 398
(1936).
12The sex problem in the prisons is a serious
one. See Fishman, Sex in Prison (1934).
13In 1937 twenty-eight states had stdrilization
laws. For a list of states and statutes see Note,
17 Bos. U. L. Rev. 246. 260 (1937).
14274 U. S. 200 (1927).
"s Upholding constitutionality: Buck v. Ball,
143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516 (1925); State ex rel.
Smith v. Schaeffer, 126 Kan. 607, 270 Pac. 604
(1928); State v. Troutman, 50 Id. 673, 299 Pac.
668 (1931); In Re Clayton, 120 Neb. 680, 234
N. W. 630 (1931); Re Main, 162 Okla. 65, 19 Pac.
(2nd) 153 (1933); Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80,
276 Pac. 921 (1929). Contra: Brewer v. Volk, 204
N. C. 186, 167 S. E. 638 (1933); Williams v.
Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N. E. 2 (1921).
16 "It is better for all the world, if, instead
of waiting to execute degenerate offsprings for
crime, or let them starve for their imbecility,

unfit from continuing their kind. .

society can prevent those who are manifestly

.

. Three

generations of imbeciles are enough." Holmes,
J. in Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S.200, 207 (1927).
17 There seems to be a tendency among psychiatrists to view many aspects of the psychopathic personality as the result of bad environment which formerly were explained in
terms of hereditary failings. See Dietholm, op.
cit. supra, note 11, at 396-398.
18 Pub. Acts 1937. No. 196. The act provided
for a hearing without a jury after conviction
for some criminal offense but before sentence.
See Note, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 613 (1939).
29][11. Rev. Stat. (1939) C. 38 §§820-825. The
statute provides that when a person is charged
with a criminal offense and it appears to the
States Attorney or Attorney-General that such
person is a "criminal sexual psychopathic person" he may file a petition with the clerk of
the court in which the person is charged stating facts to indicate such a condition. After
the filing of the petition, the court appoints two
qualified psychiatrists to ascertain whether the
person is "criminally sexually psychopathic"
and to file a report with the court. A jury is
then impaneled and a hearing had at which
time it is competent to introduce evidence of
previous crimes committed by the person being
examined. Upon recommendation of the jury
the person is committed to the psychiatric division of the Illinois State Penitentiary or the
Illinois Security Hospital until fully recovered.
After having been discharged, he is then returned to the custody of the sheriff of the county
from which he was committed to stand trial for
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by the Supreme Court of that State.20 The
Minnesota statute, however, is by far the
broadest piece of legislation on the subject yet to be enacted. It does not require,
for example, that the person for whom the
hearing is held be charged with a criminal offense as under the Illinois statute
or convicted of a crimirial offense as under the Michigan statute. The Minnesota
law in a very real sense attempts to extend the concept of insanity to sexually
irresponsible persons.21
Section I of the act provides: "The term
'psychopathic personality' as used in this
act means the existence in any person of
such conditions of emotional instability,
or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of
customary standards of good judgment, or
failure to appreciate the consequences of
his acts, or a combination of such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and
thereby dangerous to
22
other persons.
It must be conceded that the definition
is vague, and it was upon this ground that
the chief attack as to its validity seems
to have been made. The Minnesota court
while granting that the statute is imperfectly drawn, gave the section the following construction: ".... it can reasonably
be said that the language of Section 1 of
the act is intended to include those persons who by an habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters have evidenced
an utter lack of power to control .their

sexual impulses .... It would not be reasonable to apply the provisions of the
statute to every person guilty of sexual
misconduct nor even to persons having
strong sexual propensities. Such a definition would not only make the act impractical of enforcement and perhaps unconstitutional in its application, but would
also be an unwarranted departure from
the accepted meaning of the words defined.1 23 The Supreme Court of the United
States in the instant case held itself to be
bound by this construction, and as so construed, ruled that the statute was not too
vague to be upheld.
The act was further subjected to the traditional attacks on constitutional grounds.
It should be observed that the Minnesota
legislature made every effort at the outset
to induce the courts to regard the proceedings provided for as civil and not as
criminal. 2 4 Unlike the Michigan and Illinois statutes, the Minnesota statute was
2
not made a part of the criminal code. 5
Throughout the act persons subjected to
the hearings are referred to as "patients."
Construed as a civil proceeding, the constitutional questions are less difficult. Unlike the Illinois statute, the Minnesota law
makes no provision for a jury at the hearings. A similar omission proved fatal to
the Michigan statute. 26 The Minnesota
court met this objection by pointing out
that the right of trial by jury in the majority of jurisdictions is not considered
a necessary adjunct to proceedings in

the criminal offense charged against him. See
Note, 39 CoL L. Rev. 534 (1939). The constitutionality of the Illinois law has not yet been
tested in the courts. Grave doubts have been
expressed as to the validity of the statute. Note,
3 John Marshall L. Q. 407 (1938). In view of the
attitude of the Illinois court in People v. Scott,
326 IMI.327, 157 N. E.247 (1927) these doubts may
not be without substantial foundation.
20 People v. Frontczak, 288 Mich. 51, 281 N. W.
534 (1938).
23 Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 287
N. W. 297 (1939).
22 Masons Minnr. Stat. (Supp. 1940) §8992-184a.
It is interesting to compare the above statutory
definition with the following in Noyes, Modem
Clinical Psychiatry (1940) 504: "Psychopathic
personality is a term applied to various inadequacies and deviations in the personality structure of individuals who are neither psychotic
nor feebleminded, the defect existing particularly in the conative, emotional and characterological aspects of the personality. These as-

pects are not so organized ana adapted to each
other as to operate as a harmonious unit or to
permit coordination of the individual with his
environment."
23 Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 555,
287 N. W. 297, 302 (1939).
24 Commitment statutes of this general kind
are usually regarded by the courts as being of
a civil nature: Ex Parte Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121
Pac. 492 (1912); Petition of Ferrier, 103 Ill.
367
(1882); Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229
N. W. 205 (1930); Dowdell, Petitioner, 169 Mass.
387, 47 N. E. 1033 (1897). Sterilization legislation
also has been generally regarded as authorizing
civil, not criminal proceedings. "We find this
proceeding in no sense a criminal prosecution."
State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 677, 229 Pac. 668,
670 (1931).
25 Chapter 74 of Mason's Minn. Stat. (1927) in
which the statute under consideration is to be
found is entitled "Probate Courts."
26 People v. Frontczak, 286 Mich. 51, 58, 281
N. W. 534, 538 (1938).
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which sanity is determined and commitment is directed. 27 The purpose of this
statute being to expand the concept of
insanity to include the sexually irresponsible, it was argued, the rules in regard
to the commitment of the insane should
be here applied. 28 The usual theory of
these cases is that the courts are the
"guardians" of the mentally irresponsible
and that such action as the court may take
in reference to them cannot properly be
regarded as punishment.20 The guardianship theory has been utilized quite generally by the courts in upholding juvenile
court laws.30 It has also been used in
upholding statutes providing for the commitment of inebriates 3l and for the commitment 2of dependent infants to industrial
3
schools.

The Supreme Court quickly disposed of
the argument that the relator was deprived of the equal protection of the laws
by holding that the test is whether there
is any rational basis for making a class
of the group selected in the legislation33
In the opinion of the court, the class selected, as identified by the Minnesota
court, is made up of persons who are a
27 Accord: Dowdell, Petitioner, 169 Mass: 387,
47 N. E. 1033 (1897); Gaston v. Babcock, 6. Wis.
490 (1857); Ex parte O'Connor, 29 Cal. A. 225, 155

Pac. 115 (1915). Contra: In re McLaughlin, 87
New J. Eq. 138, 102 A. 439 (1917).
28 Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545,
550, 287 N. W. 297, 300 (1939).
29 Ex parte O'Connor, 29 Cal. A. 225, 155 Pac.
115 (1915); Gaston v. Babcock, 6 Wis. 490 (1857);
In re Vinstad, 169 Minn. 264, 211 N. W. 12 (1926).
30 Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151 Minn. 467, 187
N. W. 226 (1922); Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209
Iowa 813, 229 N. W. 205 (1930); Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905).

dangerous element in the community
which the legislature in its discretion
could place under appropriate control.3 "
The success or failure of the Minnesota
statute depends peculiarly upon the spirit
and intelligence with which it is administered. Certainly, it is clear that the
legislation could become the vehicle of
the most vicious abuse,35 a danger which
the Supreme Court of the United States
was well aware.36 There are several features of the legislation which experience
may prove should be remedied by amendment. Unlike the Illinois statute, for example, the Minnesota legislation does not
require the assistance of trained psychiatrists at the hearings but provides only
for the appointment of two licensed physicians. But whatever future experience
may prove, the significance of this and
similar legislative experiments can hardly
be doubted. It is indicative of a growing
desire on the part of legislators to get
at the root of anti-social behavior by the
utilization of such scientific knowledge as
is available to effect that purpose.
FRAxcis A. Ai

.

31 Leavitt v. City of Morris, 105 Minn. 170, 117
N. W. 393; Ex Parte O'Connor, 29 Cal. A. 225, 155
Pac. 115 (1915).
32 Petition of Ferrier, 103 111. 367 (1882).
33 Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173 (1910);
Barret v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26 (1913); Frost v.
Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515 (1929);
Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36 (1907).
34 Pearson v. Probate Court, 209 U. S. 270, 275
(1940).
35 Hughes, op. cit. supra note 6, at 83.
36 Pearson v. Probate Court, 209 U. S. 270, 276277 (1940).

WITHDRAWAL OF A PLEA OF GUILTY [FEDERAL]
The defendant was indicted, along with
some fifty others, for mail fraud and conspiracy and pleaded not guilty to both indictments. The counsel for the United
States, after discussion with the trial

judge, sought to induce the defendant to
change his pleas and testify against the
others involved, promising that pleas of

guilty would result in no more than a fine
or suspended sentence. Relying on these
statements, the defendant entered pleas

of guilty and became a witness for the
government After the trial, which resulted in a disagreement of the jury as to
the four principal defendants and the
acquittal of the rest, the accused learned
that the trial judge did not intend to follow the recommendations of government
counsel, and asked leave to withdraw the
pleas of guilty and substitute pleas of not
guilty. The court refused to grant the
leave and imposed a sentence of two years
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imprisonment. In Ward v. United States"
the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the District Court and held
that denial of a motion for withdrawal is
improper if the plea of guilty was entered
because of a misrepresentation.
Leave to withdraw a plea of guilty is
granted or refused at the discretion of the
trial court, subject to review by the ap-2
pellate court for an abuse of discretion.
In two states, Georgia and Iowa, there is
an absolute right to withdraw the plea
before sentence is imposed; 3 in Texas
there is a righi to withdraw before retire-4
ment of the jury to assess punishment.
New Jersey does not allow review of the
discretionary ruling.5
Where, as in the principal case, the
prosecutor promises a light punishment
in return for testimony against co-defendants, a possible basis for urging withdrawal of the plea of guilty is the existence of an enforceable contract not to
prosecute. Although the trial court was
said to possess discretionary power to rule
on the motion for withdrawal, the Supreme Court of Illinois gave effect to such
an agreement in the case of People v.
Bogolowski.6 In the one federal case in
which the question has been considered
such a compromise agreement was held
to be not binding on the court, and the
withdrawal of the plea was ordered on
other grounds.7
In determining whether to give relief
from a plea of guilty appellate courts
consider as an important factor the conduct of the trial judge. Several states have

statutes requiring the judge to explain the
consequences of the plea before accepting
it., Missouri has gone so far as to make
it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and
imprisonment, for a judge to receive the
plea without giving the defendant a reasonable time to talk with a friend and an
attorney.9
The average defendant undoubtedly believes that he can rely upon the promises
of the trial judge. When a judge induces
the prisoner to plead guilty by a promise
of leniency and then fails to carry out
his promise the appellate court will reverse. 10 When the hope of leniency has
been induced by other officers of the
court, or by those in apparent authority,
the judge who denies the motion for withdrawal will also usually be held to have
abused his discretion. Prosecutors seldom,
as in the principal case, give definite assurances that punishment will be moderated, but they frequently promise to make
recommendations of a fine or suspended
sentence. An accused who has been misled by the prosecutor's promise to recommend a light sentence can be denied relief
by a presumption of knowledge that the
court was not bound by the recommendation.' But this presumption has little
basis in fact and it seems that in fairness
the trial judge should admonish the defendant that the court will not be bound
by the recommendation, or if the plea
has already been entered, should permit
its withdrawal. 12 Reversals have also
been granted where the promise of len-

1116 F. (2d) 135 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940).
2 Fogus v. United States, 34 F. (2d) 97 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1929); Canada v. State, 144 Fla. 633, 198
So. 220 (1940); Harjo v. State (Okla. Cr. App.,
Oct., 1940) 106 Pac. (2d) LaFave v. State, 233 Wis.
432, 289 N. W. 670 (1940).
3 Woodward v. State, 13 Ga. App. 130, 78 S. E.
1009 (1913); State v. Wieland, 217 Iowa 887, 251
N. W. 757 (1933).
4 Alexander v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 23, 152
S. W. 436 (1912).
5 Clark v. State, 57 N. J. L. 489, 31 Atl. 979

statute see People v. Cooper, 366 fll. 113, 7 N. E.
(2d) 882 (1937).
9 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) §4834. In State v. Sublett, 318 Mo. 1142, 4 S. W. (2d) 463 (1928) the
Supreme Court of Missouri held that non-compliance with the statute does not affect the validity of the judgment.
10 People v. Moore, 342 fI1. 316, 174 N. E. 386

(1895).

6317 Ill.
460, 148 N. E. 260 (1925). Same case 326
I1. 253, 157 N. E. 181 (1927).
7 Camarota v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 650 (C.
C. A. 3rd, 1924).
8 Colo. Stat. Anno. C. 48 §481; Vernon's Texas
Stat. Crim. Proc. Art. 501; I1.Rev. Stat. (1939)
C. 38 §732. For a case arising under the Illinois

(1932); State v. Stephens, 71 Mo. 535 (1880);

Harjo v. State (Okla. Cr. App. Oct., 1940) 106
Pac. (2d) 527.

"People v. Ensor, 319 Ill. 255, 149 N. E. 737
(1925); Mahoney v. State, 197 Ind. 335, 149 N. E.
444 (1925).
12 People v. Campos, 3 Cal. (2d) 15,43 Pac. (2d)
274 (1935); People v. Savin, 27 Cal. App. (2d)
56, 98 Pac. (2d) 773 (1940); Griffin v. State, 12 Ga.
App. 615, 77 S. E. 1087 (1913); State v. Cochran,
332 Mo. 742, 60 S. W. (2d) 1 (1933).
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iency came from arresting officers' 3 or
from an officer of the grand jury.' 4 In a
recent case a defendant who had been
sentenced to life imprisonment under a
conviction for first degree murder was
granted a writ of coram nobis where it
appeared that he was induced to plead
guilty by the assurances of a stool pigeon
that he would only be convicted of manslaughter. 15
The plea of guilty is a confession of
the crime charged and should be entered
voluntarily and without coercion. Judges
have been reversed where they have been
guilty of coercive conduct in obtaining the
plea."6 Threats of additional charges or
extra trouble made by other court officers will also afford grounds for permitting withdrawal.' 7 Where the defendant
is induced to plead guilty because of fear
of mob violence withdrawal is allowed.' 8
Even in the absence of active misconduct on the part of the judge or court
officers, where the defendant did not understand the consequence of his plea, a
refusal to grant a withdrawal is held to
be reversible error. Possible mental incapacity of the accused at the time he entered the plea of guilty will be given
great weight in ordering reversal. 19 Mis-

takes may be the cause for the misapprehension; the accused may plead to the
wrong indictment" or he may misunderstand the nature of the crime with which
he is charged. 2" Failure to advise the defendant that he could have counsel" or
the appointment of an inexperienced or
indifferent attorney 23 will afford a basis
for finding error. However, a defendant
is usually not successful in urging withdrawal on the ground that he was induced
to plead guilty by his attorney. 24 The single fact that the defendant hoped or believed that he would receive a light sen2
tence is said not to justify a reversal. "
While the conduct of the court officers
and the understanding of the accused bulk
large in the factors which influence the
judgment of appellate courts, in the
doubtful cases there are other considerations which may tip the scales in favor
of reversal. If it appears that the accused
has a defense the upper court will be apt
to grant him a jury trial. 26 If there is a
possibility that the facts do not constitute
the crime set out in the indictment 7 or
28
if co-defendants were found not guilty
there will be a tendency to reverse. Several factors may operate in combination
where one alone would probably be in-

"3People v. Byzon, 267 III. 498, 108 N. E. 685
(1915); but Cf. People v. Brahm, 98 Cal. App.
733, 277 Pac. 896 (1929).
'14 People v. Schwarz, 201 Cal. 309, 257 Pac. 71
(1927).
"sPeople v. Butterfield, 37 Cal. App. (2d)
140, 99 Pac. (2d) 310 (1940).
16 People v. Carzoli, 340 Ill. 587, 173 N. E. 148
(1930); O'Hara v. People, 41 Mich. 623, 3 N. W.
161 (1879).
27 Peterson v. State, 58 Okla. Cr. App. 391, 54
Pac. (2d) 209 (1936) Prosecutors; Fromcke v.
State, 37 Okla. Cr. App. 421, 258 Pac. 927 (1927)
(Arresting officers).
18 State v. Poglianich, 43 Idaho 409, 252 Pac.
177 (1927); Little v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 922,
133 S. W. 1149 (1911).
19 Insanity: Eckles v. State, 132 Fla. 526, 180
So. 764 (1938); Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 691, 27
So. 618 (1900). Illiteracy: State v. Maresca, 85
Conn. 509, 83 Atl. 635 (1912). Infancy: State v.
Oberst, 127 Kan. 412. 273 Pac. 490 (1929) (17 year
old boy sentenced to life imprisonment upon
plea of guilty to first degree murder charge).
Sickness: Commonwealth v. Patch, 98 Pa. Super.
464 (1930) (Defendant, who was very sick, entered plea of guilty expecting a suspended sentence).
20 Canada v. State, 144 Fla. 633, 198 So. 220
(1940); Davis v. State, 20 Ga. 674 (1856).
2"State v. Maresca, 85 Conn. 509, 83 AtI. 635

(1912); Farley v. State, 23 Ga. App. 151, 97 S. E.
870 (1919).
22 Harris v. State, 203 Ind. 505, 181 N. E. 33
(1932); People v. Pisoni, 233 Mich. 462, 206 N. W.
986 (1926); Tipton v. State, 30 Okla Cr. App. 56,
235 Pac. 259 (1925).
2"Rhodes v. State, 199 Ind. 183, 156 N. E. 389
(1927); State v. Paglianich, 43 Idaho 409, 252 Pac.
177 (1927).
24 Swinea v. State, 196 Ark. 1179, 112 S. W.
(2d) 969 (1938); State v. Wood, 200 Wash. 21, 93
Pac. (2d) 294 (1939); But Cf. State v. McAllister,
96 Mont. 348, 30 Pac. (2d) 821 (1934); People v.
Casaras, 104 Mont. 404, 66 Pac. (2d) 774 (1937).
2"People v. Barnard, 296 1n. App. 156. 15 N. E.
(2d) 915 (1938); People v. Chesnas, 325 II1. 361.
156 N. E. 372 (1927); People v. Dabner, 153 Cal.
398, 95 Pac. 880 (1908). The last two cases involved death sentences.
2' Ketring v. State, 209 Ind. 618, 200 N. E. 212
(1936); People v. Plechowiak, 278 Mich. 530, 270
N. W. 793 (1936). However, a defendant will not
be permitted to withdraw the plea in order to
enter a merely technical defense: Carr v. State,
194 Ind. 162, 143 N. E. 378, 83 A. L. R. 1349 (1924)
(Illegal search); Bartozek v. State, 186 Wis. 644,
203 N. W. 374 (1925) (Illegal arrest).
27 LaFave v. State, 233 Wis. 342, 289 N. W. 670
(1940).
28 People v. Rucker, 254 Mich. 342, 236 N. W.
801 (1931).
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sufficient. For example, the defendants'
fear of a state witness, their poor command of the English language, and an unusually severe sentence led the Supreme
Court of Florida to say that in the furshould
therance of justice the defendants
9
be allowed a jury trial.2
Since the defendant in the principa
case made a confession of his guilt to the
court, the question remains whether that
confession might be used in evidence at
his subsequent trial. The federal courts,
including the Supreme Court of the
United States, have held that a former
0
plea of guilty is inadmissible as evidence'
courts follow
of
state
and the majority
3
the same rule. '
So long as judicial discretion is exercised liberally there is little danger of defeating justice by holding a defendant to
his plea of guilty, even though that plea
involves a confession and a waiver of jury
trial. At the same time there is a considerable saving to the state of the time
and money which would have been spent
on a prosecution. From a review of the
cases it is evident that appellate courts
are vigilant in guarding against the overzealous prosecutor; guilty pleas obtained
by outright coercion or fraudulent misrepresentation are not allowed to stand.
However, too much emphasis should not
be placed on protecting only the person
who has been intentionally deceived. If
the jealous protection of every defendant's rights is an end to be sought, the
29 Artigas v. State, 140 Fla. 671, 192 So. 795
(1939).
30 Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220
(1926); Pharr v. United States, 48 F. (2d) 770
(C. C. A., 9th, 1931). This rule does not apply
to a plea of guilty made before a United States
Commissioner: United States v. Adelman, 107
F. (2d) 499 (C. C. A., 2d, 1939).
3' State v. Hook, 174 Minn. 590, 219 N. W. 926

primary question in every case should be:
"Was the accused misled by any cause
whatsoever,-misled as to the nature of
the charge, the effect of his plea, or the
probable severity of his punishment?"
Although, from an administrative viewpoint it is undesirable to allow a defendant to speculate on his punishment and
to then withdraw his plea if he is disappointed, it is more important that no
defendant be sentenced who has entered
his plea because of misapprehension.
Furthermore, since compromise agreements are seldom held to be binding upon
the state, it is to the advantage of the
prosecutor to allow defendants to withdraw their pleas of guilty in case the
judge does not follow the recommendations for leniency. Few defendants will
offer testimony against accomplices if they
have neither the assurance that the prosecutor's recommendations will be followed,
nor the knowledge that the guilty plea
can be withdrawn in case the promised
light sentence is not awarded.
In any case, legal discretion should be
exercised liberally in favor of giving the
defendant a chance to prove his innocence
to a jury. It is of some importance that
the courts turn over to the penal authorities for reformation persons who have no
cause to feel that they have been "railroaded" to prison without a fair opportunity to prove their innocence.
N.iL WALsH.
(1928); Heath v. State, 23 Okla. Cr. App. 382, 214
Pac. 1091 (1923); State v. Jensen, 74 Utah 299,
279 Pac. 506 (1929). Contra: Rascon v. State, 47
Ariz. 501, 57 Pac. (2d) 304 (1936); People v. Steinmetz, 240 N. Y. 411, 148 N. E. 597 (1925). The
majority rule applies only to a plea of guilty
entered at the trial and later withdrawn. It
does not apply to a plea of guilty made at a
preliminary hearing. See State v. Call, 100 Me.
403, 61 Atl. 833 (1905).

CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE [FLORIDA]
On September 20, 1940, the Supreme
Court of Florida, in State v. Heines,' sustained, by a four to two decision, a criminal
information charging a chiropractor with
manslaughter. In so doing the court overruled the order of the trial Court quashing
the information.

The information charged that defendant
"did unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and
by unskillful acts and procurement and
culpable negligence and the exercise of
gross ignorance and lack of ordinary
1 197 So. 787 (September 20, 1940).
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knowledge and skill in medicine, 2 ....

prescribe and instruct the said Henry Cole
against the use of a certain drug, to wit:
Insulin, in a negligent attempt to cure an
infection of the foot of the said Henry Cole,
and the said Henry Cole then and there to
the knowledge of the said R. L. Heines,
was suffering from the disease known as
diabetes, in the treatment of which insulin
was indispensable .... and as a result of

the said R. L. Heines prescribing that the
said Henry Cole not take Insulin, as aforesaid, the said infection spread with such
rapidity that the said Henry Cole did die."
In considering whether this information
should be quashed the court should have
kept in mind two propositions: first, the
Florida statute, that "no indictment shall
be quashed... for any cause whatsoever,
unless the court shall be of the opinion
that the indictment is so vague, indistinct
and indefinite as to mislead the accused
and embarrass him in the preparation of
his defense; ' 3 secondly, that if there was
no basis for criminal negligence alleged
in the information, the information should
have been quashed.
The cardinal point made by the minority is that the information was vague in
that it did not charge sufficient facts to
establish causal relation between the advice of the defendant and the death of the
decedent. The information charges the
2In connection with this part of the charge,
it is interesting to note the requirements for
the practice of chiropractic in Florida, 'ach
applicant shall be a graduate from an accredited high school and shall be a full-time graduate of a recognized chartered chiropractic school
or college which requires for graduation the
completion of a four years' course of not less

than six months each and not less than four
thousand hours' active attendance in the same.
The time spent in night or correspondence
courses shall not be counted as part of said
four thousand hours." In addition, an examination must be passed over the following subjects: anatomy, physiology, chemistry, bacteriology, pathology, hygiene, chiropractic analysis,
orthopedia, and adjusting as taught by recognized chiropractic schools and colleges. Florida
Statutes (1940 parts), §§3442 and 3445.

3 Florida Statutes (1940 parts), §8369.
4 Cf. State v. McFadden, 48 Wash. 259,

414 (1908). See note 15, infra.

93 Pac.

a A good statement of the rule generally followed as to the degree of certainty required in

foot condition as the cause of death but
the instructions given by Dr. Heines to
the deceased are not specifically set forth;
nor is there any allegation that the decedent followed the instructions. Thus it is
not stated in the information that the
death of Henz y Cole was the necessary
and certain result of the directions which
Dr. Heines gave him with respect to the
insulin.4 It may be argued that under the
Florida statute it is not necessary to allege these things. 5 Indeed, it is not, where
such material propositions are clearly to
be inferred from the matters alleged in
the information. But this information
does not-state facts from which it can be
inferred, with any degree of certainty, that
there was a casual relation between the
following of the instructions and the death
of the decedent. From the statement of
facts it cannot even be assumed that the
decedent followed the instructions; for it
is more reasonable to assume that he discontinued the insulin for a longer period
than advised. Dr. Heines was treating a
foot sore. He had no intention of treating the diabetes and therefore no reason
for so sharply changing the decedent's insulin consumption as to affect the diabetes. The very fact that this information does not make a clear affirmative
statement of causal relation weakens it;
this fact coupled with the additional fact
that it permits a presumption that there
an indictment is found in 27 American Jurisprudence 625. It is as follows: 'The true test

is not whether the indictment could possibly
be made more definite and certain, but whether
it contains every element of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises
the defendant of what he must be prepared to
meet, and whether, in case other criminal proceedings are taken against him later, based on
the same matters, the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former
acquittal or conviction in bar of the later proceedings.' This is substantially the test set out
by the Florida Statute, and it is likewise set
out by statute in South Dakota. State v. Morse,
35 S. D. 18, 150 N. W. 293 (1914). Illinois courts
hold that an indictment must allege all facts
necessary to constitute the crime charged and
must do so with sufficient certainty; sufficiency
is defined as the degree of specificity necessary
to notify accused of the charge he is to meet
and to enable him to prepare his defense. People
v. Moore, 368 Ill. 455, 14 N. E. (2d) 494 (1938);
People v. Shaver, 367 Ill. 339, 11 N.E. (2d) 400
(1937).
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was no causal relation, makes the defect
more serious.6
The second point the court should have
considered is whether, accepting as true
all that the information charged, and assuming causal relation, sufficient negligence is alleged to constitute criminal
negligence. The rule recognized by the
courts generally is that "a physician ig
required to exercise only that degree of
care, diligence, judgment, and skill which
other physicians of good standing of the
same school or system of practice usually
exercise in the same or similar localities
under like or similar circumstances, having due regard to the advanced state of
the medical profession at the time in
question." T A second rule which might
be applied is that all persons practicing
medicine in any capacity might be required to meet the standard of practice
of the average physician and surgeon in
general practice in the same or similar
localities. The Florida Supreme Court
8
showed definitely in Foster v. Thornton,
that it did not follow the second standard.
There it required that a witness testifying
upon the issue of negligent practice by a
defendant chiropractor, qualify himself as
a chiropractor. That the law of Florida
recognizes an independent standard of
practice for chiropractors is further indicated by the fact that the State of Florida
licenses chiropractors as such.
This brings the present court to a di-

lemma. The rule generally followed is
the law in Florida." Probably no court
follows the second rule suggested, except
through error, unless the case is governed by one of three exceptions to the
general rule. Those exceptions are: (1)
practice without a license,' 0 (2) practice
in violation of a license, (3) practice in
diagnosis." Furthermore, in applying the
rule generally used the court will be unable to give a sufficient charge on chiropractors' standard of practice because
diabetics do not as a rule go to chiropractors for treatment; this is an exceptional case. The majority in the Heines
case indicated that it would not support
a judgment based upon statements by
chiropractors, as expert witnesses, as to
what they would do in such a case; it is
what they actually have done and are
accustomed to doing that makes a standard of practice. Therefore, the court must
either bring this case under an exception
to the general rule, or find a way to set up
a chiropractors' standard of practice with
respect to treating the diabetic patient for
chiropractic ills. 12 A possible escape from
this dilemma would be a general negligence charge to the jury, making the defendant's status as a chiropractor merely
one of the circumstances bearing upon
1
the determination of reasonable care. 3
But here too, there would be no knowledge of a chiropractors' standard for the
jury to draw upon and it would con-

6 If we follow the presumption that there is no
causal relation alleged, a serious question is
then raised as to whether the information
charges criminal intent. The information seeks
to charge culpable negligence which according
to the Florida Statute is a substitute for criminal intent. Florida Statutes (1940 Parts), §7141.
But even if the information does charge culpable negligence, the fact that causal relation is
not clearly shown impedes the inference that
the defendant should have realized that death
would be the necessary and certain result of his
act. If this inference is not clear, the inference
of criminal intent is not clear. For further development of this point see Cook, "Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law," 26 Yale
Law Journal 658 (1917). See also discussion of
State v. McFadden in note 15, infra.
7 Kuechler v. Volgmann, 180 Wis. 238, 192 N.W.
1015. 31 A.L.R. 326, (1923).
125 Fla. 699, 170 So. 459, (1936).
liIdem.
10 Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261 Mass. 40, 158
N.E. 270, (1927).

11Kuechler v. Volgmann, 180 Wis. 238, 192
N.W. 1015 (1923).
12 An issue might be formed as to whether or
not Dr. Heines was negligent in accepting a
diabetic patient in the first place. Evidence of
chiropractors could then come in upon this
point. A satisfactory special negligence formula
could be charged to the jury in accordance
with the rule generally used, the rule here being the chiropractors' standard of practice. But
such negligence would hardly be gross negligence constituting criminal liability. Cf. Deward
v. Whitney, 298 Mass. 41, 9 N.E. (2d) 369 (1937).
13 When evidence cannot be secured to formulate a special negligence formula in accordance
with the rule generally used, and the physicians'
and surgeons' formula is improper, a court will
often fall back upon the general negligence
formula; the care of an ordinary prudent man
under the same or similar circumstances. The
factors requiring a special negligence formula,
are disregarded as such, and are dropped into
the position of circumstances bearing upon the
setting of the general negligence standard. See
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sciously or unconsciously substitute its
casual knowledge of the best known procedure in dealing with diabetics-the in-

petence did make him subject to the
physicians' and surgeons' standard of

sulin therapy of the physician and
surgeon.
By very liberal construction the information will bear the interpretation that
the cause of death charged was the diabetes. Were Dr. Heines a physician and
surgeon competent to treat all phases of
disease, he would be liable for incompetent treatment of the diabetes regardless
of his specific undertaking, for his training and competence would include this.24
Cases were cited by the majority in which
physicians and surgeons were held liable
for gross negligence under similar facts. 15
However, no cases involving a chiropractor were cited. Since a chiropractor is
not to be held under the physicians' and
surgeons' standard these cases should
have little weight here.
Even if Dr. Heines' training and corn-

difficult to find him guilty of manslaughter
for an act of negligence according to that
standard. For, it must be assumed that

the very interesting case of Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228, 1 L.R.A. 719, (1888),
where the court was unable to formulate a
special negligence formula properly due the
defendant, and fell back upon the general negligence formula.
' 4 Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 Pac.
(2d) 654 (1937).
1S Hampton v. State, 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421
(1905), was a manslaughter case wherein a duly
licensed physician and surgeon negligently performed a surgical operation upon a woman's
womb from which she died. The case is authority for the proposition that a duly licensed
physician and surgeon is guilty of criminal
negligence, if grossly ignorant, incompetent, or
grossly inattentive to his patient, though he
acts with good intent and with the expectation
that the result will prove beneficial. State v.
Lester, 127 Minn. 282, 149 N.W. 297 (1914), also
cited by the majority, involved a duly licensed
physician and surgeon who negligently operated an x-ray machine and inflicted a mortal
bum upon the decedent. Karsunky v. State,
197 Wash. 87, 84 Pac. (2d) 390 (1938), the third
decision cited by the court, was a case of
manslaughter concerning an unlicensed drugless healer who undertook to treat the decedent for diabetes and clearly advised him not
to use insulin at all, but to follow the defendants' suggested carbohydrate diet and to
take the defendant's medicine. The case is
distinguishable from the case at bar in that
Dr. Karsunky undertook to treat the decedent
for diabetes while no such charge was made
against Dr. Heines in the instant case. Where
a doctor's skill and competence are of a general nature, his undertaking to treat only a

practice in treating diabetes, it would be

the allegation of the information is true;

that the foot condition was the cause of
death. That the discontinuance of insulin
prejudiced the diabetic condition is irrelevant, if it was not the cause of death. 16
On this information we must find the defendant criminally negligent in treating

the foot sore. Indeed, the information
charges that the discontinuance of insulin
made the foot condition grow worse. But
no indication of the nature of proper therapy is given. Reference to decedent's
diabetes is made to indicate that Dr.
Heines was criminally negligent in failing
to realize that discontinuance of insulin
was not the proper therapy.

However,

that inference is substantially rebutted
restricted phase of a patient's condition will
not limit his liability. On the other hand, a
doctor with restricted training and liability
may increase the scope of his liability by undertaking treatment beyond his skill and competence. See Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312,
67 Pac. (2d) 654, (1937). Furthermore, Dr. Karsunky was practicing without a license, and
was subject to the standards of practice of the
ordinary physician and surgeon in the locality,
whereas Dr. Heines was practicing with a
license and was subject to the standards of
practice of the ordinary chiropractor in the
locality. Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261 Mass. 40,
158 N.E. 270, (1927). See also State v. Smith,
25 Idaho 541,138 Pac. 1107, (1914). The court overlooked State v. McFadden, 48 Wash. 259, 93 Pac.
414, (1908), a manslaughter case, wherein a duly
licensed physician instructed the mother of a
sick child under his care, to withhold from it
all food save water, fruit juice, and such other
nourishment as he might direct; the child
diet of starvation. The information was held
insufficient because it did not show the starvation of the child to be the necessary and
certain results of the directions. See also State
v. Smith, 25 Idaho 541, 138 Pac. 1107, (1914).
16 It is possible that this sore was a diabetic
sore; but the State's attorney could have ascertained this fact and charged it. This would
still have left an issue of negligence in diagnosis. The Florida courts hold that a chiropractor in diagnosing must meet the physicians'
standard, and must determine at his peril
whether or not the ailment is one which can be
properly treated by chiropractic. Foster v.
Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 170 So. 459, (1936). See

also Kuechler v. Volgmann, 180 Wis. 238, 192
N.W. 1015, 31 A.L.R. 126, (1923).
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by the inference that Dr. Heines did
not know the exact nature of the sore,
that he was not negligent in diagnosing
it, and that he was carefully trying to
discover a proper therapy for it.
The majority seemed to feel that the
public-welfare policy of protecting the
people from incompetent practitioners had
particular application in this case. They
felt impelled by it, to hold that Dr. Heines
was practicing in violation of his license,
and that he was therefore answerable to
the standard of care and practice of the
average physician and surgeon in the
same locality. But it seems that a better
way to protect the public would be by
means of licensing and providing for civil
liability, rather than attempting to regulate by means of criminal liability. Doctors will go ahead and try to cure persons
by using their best efforts and being firm
enough to take the risks of difficult cases
and treatment where only civil liability
faces them, but criminal liability might
deter not only the few incompetents, substantially regulated by license and civil
liability at present, but also the highly
competent doctor whose activity should
not be limited.
A further point to be urged is that in
no case should the law operate to the
prejudice of any one group. The chiropractor should not be made to answer to
the physicians' and surgeons' standard.
The incompetent practitioner is a problem of the chiropractic profession- as of
eveiy other medical profession and is a
problem relative to the standard of care
and practice of the chiropractors. The

degree to which a chiropractor is chargeable with knowledge of the possible effect
of his treatment upon the individual, is
limited by the training and competency
of the chiropractor, 1 7 provided he is practicing according to his license. If we
assume that treatment by a chiropractor
is proper for a foot sore, we assume that
drugless therapy is. To this degree the
chiropractor has not exceeded his license.
The facts of this case-the purpose of Dr.
Heines' treatment-strongly indicate that
he, in good faith, in the light of his training and experience, was warranted in not
anticipating so grave a result from his
advice. Under the circumstances of this
case, the standard proposed by the majority becomes unduly severe, for here a
doctor of a school held incompetent to
treat a given disease, and whose members
never treat that disease, treats someone
who has it, for another disease which
members of the school are held perfectly
competent to treat.1 s Shall we hold Dr.
Heines grossly ignorant in his treatment
because he treats a condition he is perfectly competent to treat?1 9 Apparently
20
the majority would do just that.
Turning back to the information, and
viewing it in the light of these considerations and the two propositions originally
set forth, the conclusion is inescapable
that the information should have been
quashed. It is vague and ambiguous. And
finally, when this case comes to trial the
strong dicta of this opinion, that the defendant be held to the general physicians' standard, should certainly not be
followed.
ELLSWORTH POWER.

I7Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 Pac.
(2d) 654, (1937).
28 The Florida Statute does not prohibit chiropractors from treating foot sores. Florida Rev.
Stat. (1940), §3446 says: "Any chiropractor who
has complied with the provisions of this Chapter may adjust three hundred or more articulations of the body and all structures adjacent
thereto including the use of x-ray for diagnosis,
but shall not prescribe or administer to any
person any medicine or drug included in ma-

for which chiropractic was a recognized therapeutic agency, and which was neither contagious nor infectious, we think a chiropractor
might treat the patient for that disease, if done
honestly and in good faith, and not as a mere
cover for treating contagious or infectious diseases. In this case the child was suffering
from pulmonary tuberculosis. She also developed bowel trouble. There is no question but
the chiropractor acted in perfect good faith
and treated the child for bowel trouble. We
think the employment of the chiropractor
under the circumstances here shown raised no
presumption and was no evidence of either
negligence or neglect."
20 "The information in this case clearly
charged that the defendant was in such a position and that the death of a person was
directly traceable to his gross ignorance."
State v. Heines, 197 So. 787, 788 (1940).

teria medica, perform any surgery, except as

hereinabove stated, nor practice obstetrics."
19 In Coty v. Baughman, 50 S.D. 372, 210 N.W.
348, 48 A.L.R. 1205 (1926), the court said: "A
chiropractor is not prohibited by the statute
from treating patients. He is only prohibited
from practicing obstetrics and from treating
'contagious and infectious diseases.' If a tubercular patient developed some other disease

